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Abstract
Aggressive deregulation of the mortgage market in the early 1980s triggered innova-
tions that greatly reduced the required home equity of U.S. households. This allowed
households to cash-out a large part of accumulated equity, which equaled 71 percent
of GDP in 1982. A borrowing surge followed: Household debt increased from 43 to 62
percent of GDP in the 1982-2000 period. What are the welfare implications of such a re-
form for borrowers and savers? This paper uses a calibrated general equilibrium model
of lending from the wealthy to the middle class to evaluate these eﬀects quantitatively.
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Who beneﬁts the most from a reform which relaxes a binding borrowing constraint? Bor-
rowers or savers? At the microeconomic level, only borrowers beneﬁt because they are con-
strained. In other words, only for them the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint is positive.
The macroeconomic interaction involves an additional consideration: Allowing larger bor-
rowing raises the interest rate for while, i.e., the borrowers’ terms of trade worsen for some
time, and this redistributes the beneﬁts. Hence, who gains the most is a quantitative issue.
The U.S. economy underwent a drastic reform of this type in the early 1980s. Most
household debt in the United States requires an initial equity share in the home or vehicle
that serves as collateral—a down payment—and a minimum rate of debt amortization—
which determines the rate of equity accumulation. The Monetary Control and the Garn-St.
Germain Acts of 1980 and 1982 allowed market innovations that dramatically reduced these
equity requirements: Greater access to sub-prime mortgages, mortgage reﬁnancing, and home
equity loans, reduced eﬀective down payments and increased eﬀective repayment periods.
More important for the short run, it enabled households to cash-out previously accumulated
home equity, which in 1982 amounted to 71 percent of GDP. This was followed by a huge
wave of household borrowing.
In this paper we focus on the welfare eﬀects of such a reform using a calibrated model
economy. The model is a general equilibrium framework for household borrowing from Camp-
bell and Hercowitz (2006), which combines trade between a patient saver and an impatient
borrower with equity requirements on housing and consumer durables typical of collateralized
loan contracts. The model has a simple structure, but it captures the main features of the
distribution of debt and ﬁnancial assets across households in the US economy. Households in
the ﬁrst-to-ninth deciles of the wealth distribution owed 73.0 percent of total household debt
in 1962, and 73.4 percent in 2001. Households in the tenth decile held 54.2 percent of total
ﬁnancial assets in 1962 and 72.8 percent in 2001. Hence, a large fraction of households owe
debt to a small fraction of households. The model’s equilibrium resembles this in an extreme
way. The borrower owes all the debt to the saver.
With the model calibrated to the period prior to 1983, and the ﬁnancial reform calibrated
to the actual reduction of equity requirements on households, we compute the transition
across the two corresponding steady states. Because the reform allows the borrower to cash-
out a large amount of accumulated equity, the equity constraint may not bind for some time.
We use a modiﬁed version of the Fair-Taylor (1983) algorithm to solve the model, which
determines when along the transition path the equity constraint binds. Across steady states,
1savers’ welfare increases and borrowers’ declines due to the higher debt. The borrowers’ gains
can accrue only during the transition.
The model’s transition starts oﬀ with previously constrained households cashing out some
of the home equity in excess of the new lower requirement. This borrowing surge increases the
interest rate. Over time, the debt stabilizes at a higher level while the interest rate returns
gradually to it’s steady state. This resembles the evidence on the comovement of household
debt and interest rates since 1983.
The welfare analysis of the calibrated economy indicates that both households gain in
terms of discounted utility at the time of the reform, although the saver’s gain is much larger
than the borrower’s. The borrowers’ gain is due to high consumption and durable goods
purchases during the period following the reform. Of course, accumulated debt implies that
at the new steady state a borrower’s utility ﬂow is lower than at the starting steady state.
The savers gains initially while the terms of trade changed in their favor, i.e., the interest
rate is high, and moving to the new steady state with higher assets.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides the institutional background for
the analysis and Section 3 presents the model. The steady-state to steady-state comparison
following the reform is addressed in Section 4. In Section 5 we report ﬁrst the calibration of
the model and then the computed transition process. It concludes with the evaluation of the
reform’s welfare eﬀects. In Section 6 we discuss the actual evolution of household debt and
interest rates. Section 7 presents an extension of the model with an irreversibility constraint
on durable goods investment. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Institutional Background
Our analysis takes the institutions structuring the household debt market as determined by
regulation, so we begin with a review of how these have changed since 1982. It is helpful
to emphasize ﬁrst one feature of this market that remains the same: Homes and vehicles
collateralize most household debt. According to the 1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics
of Consumers, homes and vehicles collateralized 85 percent of total U.S. household debt. The
analogous percentage from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances was 90 percent.1
From the middle 1930s until the early 1980s, 15 and 30 year amortized mortgages ac-
counted for most of collateralized household debt. These required the home owner to take
an initial equity share at the time of purchase and to accumulate further equity as the debt
1Details of these observations are provided in Campbell and Hercowitz (2006), Appendix A.
2amortizes. The implied forced savings reﬂected the desire of the Roosevelt administration
to reduce the likelihood of a mass default of highly-leveraged mortgagees, as occurred at
the beginning of the Great Depression. A host of ﬁnancial regulations supported this pol-
icy. The most prominent gave tax incentives for Savings and Loan associations to ﬁnance
home mortgage lending with demand deposits and protected this trade from other ﬁnancial
intermediaries. The volatile ﬁnancial markets of the 1970’s made these and other New Deal
ﬁnancial regulations untenable. Congress and Presidents Carter and Reagan responded with
the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982. These led to an
aggressive reorganization of the housing ﬁnance system.2
Instruments for avoiding forced saving existed before ﬁnancial deregulation. One could
cash-out previously accumulated home equity either by taking a second mortgage or home-
equity loan or by reﬁnancing the debt with a loan exceeding the current mortgage balance,
but lack of competition in lending made these rare. Deregulation lowered the cost of these
instruments for all ﬁnancial intermediaries and households. Accordingly, household debt
began to grow. The ratio of mortgage debt to the value of owner-occupied homes was 0.31 in
1982, 0.37 in 1990, and 0.42 in 1995. Since then, it has ﬂuctuated around this higher level.
A more detailed appreciation of how deregulation aﬀected home equity accumulation
can be gained by examining how households structured their mortgage debts. Time-series
observations on typical terms of ﬁrst mortgages are available from the Federal Home Finance
Board’s Monthly Interest Rate Survey, but these provide an incomplete picture because they
ignore subordinated debt used to lower the eﬀective down payments. Hence, we proceed
by examining households debts in the Survey of Consumer Finances. Understanding that
deregulation had the potential to vastly change households’ ﬁnancial decisions, the Federal
Reserve Board resurrected its Survey of Consumer Finances program in the early 1980s,
which collected the ﬁrst “modern” SCF data set in 1983.3 The Federal Reserve carried
out subsequent SCFs every three years. These surveys gathered detailed information on
households’ balance sheets and use of diﬀerent ﬁnancial instruments and institutions, so they
2Green and Wachter (2005) provide a history of New Deal mortgage institutions and of the process of
dismantling them in the early 1980’s. See also Florida (1986) and the articles contained therein.
3The code book to the 1983 SCF (written initially in 1985) begins “There have been many changes in
ﬁnancial markets during the last decade. Inﬂation and interest rates increased sharply in the late 1970s and
then fell after recessions in 1980 and 1981-82. Major ﬁnancial innovations occurred, such as the introduction
of money market funds, and the regulation of ﬁnancial markets altered dramatically after enactment of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. To assess the eﬀects of these changes
on the ﬁnancial position of households, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (and other
agencies) joined together to sponsor the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).”
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Table 1: Mortgage Terms and Instruments from the Survey of Consumer Finances
provide the data required for tracking the eﬀects of deregulation on households’ mortgage
borrowing decisions.
For six SCFs, Table 1 reports two key summary statistics characterizing households’
mortgage borrowing, the percentage of mortgagees who have reﬁnanced the mortgage on
their current residence, and the average home equity to value ratio for new home purchases.
The ﬁrst survey considered is that of 1983, which was collected only shortly after the Garn-
St. Germain Act became law in October 1982. We consider these observations as indicative
of mortgage borrowing just before deregulation’s completion. We do not report results from
the 1986 SCF, because of its problematic sampling procedure.4 The other surveys we do use
are from 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001.
Consider ﬁrst the percentage of mortgagees who have ever reﬁnanced.5 In 1983, approxi-
mately 10 percent of mortgagees had reﬁnanced. By 1989, this had more than doubled, and
it increased again to 33 percent in 1992. In 1995, it reached almost 41 percent, and it was
slightly higher than that in 1998 and 2001. Hence, mortgage reﬁnancing went from atypical
to commonplace in about 12 years.
The ﬁnal column reports the ratio of home equity to home value for newly purchased
homes.6 These homes’ owners have had very little time to accumulate equity through debt
4To create a panel data set, the 1986 survey sampled households living in the same housing units as the
respondents to the 1983 survey. This non-standard sampling makes the resulting observations not represen-
tative of the U.S. population in that year
5We identify these households by comparing the year of home purchase with the year their oldest mortgage
debt was issued.
6For the 1983 SCF, we deﬁned a newly-purchased home as any home purchased in 1982 or 1983. For
the other surveys, all such homes were purchased by their current occupant in the survey year. The values
reported equal the averages of this ratio across all such homes with mortgage debt exceeding 50 percent of
4amortization, so these ratios are very close to the homeowners’ eﬀective down payments. We
expect deregulation to lower down payments, because it allowed lenders to more easily issue
second or third mortgages when closing the home purchase. Because of these widespread op-
tions, down payments on individual mortgages after deregulation do not provide information
about the eﬀective initial equity shares. In 1983, this ratio equalled 22.6 percent. Although
it changed little through 1992, it dropped four percentage points between 1992 and 1995 (to
16.9 percent). In the 1998 and 2001 surveys it equaled 16.4 percent.
These ﬁgures reﬂect the substantial changes in homeowners’ ﬁnancing options after dereg-
ulation. Reﬁnancing became cheaper and thus also more widespread, and typical down pay-
ments on new homes fell considerably although with a delay of about ten years. We have
also examined mortgagees use of home-equity lines of credit. Total debt incurred with this
instrument never exceeded 1.5 percent of mortgagees’ home value. Explaining the timing
and relative magnitudes of these institutional changes lies beyond the scope of this paper.
Our analysis takes the reduced equity requirements for household debt as given and uses a
quantitative general-equilibrium model to determine their implications for macroeconomic
dynamics and market participants’ welfare.
3 The Model
The model builds on the general equilibrium framework with household debt in Campbell
and Hercowitz (2006). It combines ﬁnancial trade between a patient saver and an impatient
borrower with an equity requirement typical of collateralized loan contracts in the United
States. The diﬀerent rates of time preference generate intertemporal trade in the form of
household debt owed by the borrower to the saver. Becker (1980) showed that there exists
no steady-state with positive consumption by all households in a similar economy without
constraints on debt. In our model, the equity requirement limits the borrower’s debt, so
both households have positive consumption in the steady state. The interest rate equals
the saver’s rate of time preference, and the equity requirement prevents the borrower from
expanding debt without further purchases of durable goods.
We study the transition path from one steady state to another with a lower equity require-
ment. The borrower begins this transition with a large amount of equity no longer required
for borrowing, so the equity requirement might not always bind.
This section presents preferences, production technology, and the constraints on trade
the home’s value.
5between the two households. It concludes with a discussion of both households’ utility max-
imization problems and the deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium.
3.1 Preferences
The saver’s and the borrower’s preferences diﬀer in two respects: The saver is more patient
and does not work. The ﬁrst assumption generates a concentration of assets in a relatively
small number of households. This follows Krusell and Smith’s (1998) use of heterogeneity
in thrift to generate an empirically realistic wealth distribution. The second assumption
simpliﬁes the model along and unimportant dimension. Because there are few savers and
because they should each enjoy some of their wealth in the form of leisure, we expect them
to contribute little to aggregate labor supply. Accordingly, abstracting from the saver’s labor
supply choice does not substantially alter the results.7
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where ˆ β < ˜ β. In (1), ˆ St, ˆ Ct, and ˆ Nt are the borrower’s stock of durable goods—assumed to
be proportional to the service ﬂow—its consumption of non-durable goods and labor supply.
In (2), ˜ St, and ˜ Ct are the saver’s consumption of the two goods. We use ˆ A and ˜ A to represent
borrower and saver speciﬁc versions of A for the remainder of the paper.
3.2 Technology
The aggregate production function is Yt = KαN
1−α
t , where 0 < α < 1, Yt is output, K is
a constant capital stock, and Nt is labor input. We discuss the implications of allowing for
productive capital accumulation below in Section 8.
The households can use output for either non-durable consumption or durable goods
purchases. That is, Yt = Ct + Xt, where Ct represents aggregate non-durable consumption
and Xt = St+1−(1 − δ)St is aggregate investment in the durable good, which depreciates at
the rate δ.
7When we endow savers with the borrowers’ intratemporal preferences and calculate the steady state of
the model calibrated as described below, savers choose to not work at all.
63.3 Trade
All trade takes place in competitive markets. The households sell capital services at the rental
rate Ht and labor at the wage Wt to the representative ﬁrm. They also trade in collateralized
debt, which is the only available security. The households’ outstanding debts at the end of
period t are ˆ Bt+1 and ˜ Bt+1. We denote the corresponding gross interest rate with Rt, which
adjusts every period.
3.3.1 The Equity Requirement
An exogenous equity requirement on collateral constrains debt. This mimics a typical feature
of loan contracts in the United States: An equity share that starts from a positive level
(the down payment) and increases over time (if debt amortizes more rapidly than the good
depreciates). In the model, the parameters capturing this feature are 0 ≤ π < 1, the initial
equity share, and φ, which governs the speed of subsequent equity accumulation. When
a loan is collateralized by a durable good j periods old, the required equity share at the
beginning of the following period is





(1 − π). (3)
For newly purchased goods (j = 0), the equity share is π. As the good ages (j increases), the
equity share converges to one when φ > δ, and stays constant when φ = δ. We call the case
of φ > δ accelerated amortization, because the equity share increases over time. When φ = δ
the equity share remains at its initial level because debt and durable goods depreciate at the
same rate. The institutional background presented above suggests modelling deregulation by
lowering the initial equity share with a drop in π and lowering the rate of equity accumulation
by bringing φ closer to δ.
For a household with positive debt, the total amount of equity at the beginning of period
t + 1 is (1 − δ)St+1 − RtBt+1, where the durable stock is adjusted for depreciation and the
debt for accumulated interest. This household’s required equity in durable goods sums the
equity requirements on the (depreciated) goods of all ages from equation (3):





Using the deﬁnition of ej, (4) can be expressed as a repayment constraint.





7Here, a debtor’s total liability cannot exceed a linear function of the value of the goods that
collateralize it with coeﬃcients which decrease with π and φ. If φ = δ, the right-hand side
of (5) reduces to (1 − δ)(1 − π)St+1. In this case, the constraint is formally identical to that
which Kiyotaki (1998) derives from an environment with costly repossession. We do not
stress this interpretation of the constraint, because we assume that public policy decisions
determined π and φ rather than considerations of private contracting.
3.4 Utility Maximization
We now examine both households’ utility maximization problems. For this, we conjecture
that in equilibrium the saver owns all physical capital and the borrower’s debt. With the
proposed equilibrium in hand, verifying this is straightforward.
3.4.1 The Borrower’s Problem
To formulate the borrower’s utility maximization problem, it is helpful to ﬁrst represent the
equity requirement recursively. Deﬁne




j ˆ Xt−j/Rt. (6)
This is the maximum debt principle this household can carry out of period t. Multiplying ˆ Vt
by (1 − φ)Rt−1/Rt and subtracting the result from ˆ Vt+1 yields




(1 − δ)(1 − π)
Rt
ˆ Xt (7)
That is, the limit to the borrower’s debts evolves recursively. With this deﬁnition of Vt, the
equity requirement becomes
ˆ Bt+1 ≤ ˆ Vt+1., (8)
Together, (7) and (8) represent the borrower’s required equity in its durable goods stock.
Given ˆ V0, R−1 ˆ B0 and ˆ S0, the borrower chooses sequences of ˆ Ct, ˆ Xt, ˆ Nt, and ˆ Bt+1 and ˆ Vt
to maximize the utility function in (1), subject to the sequence of budget constraints
ˆ Ct + ˆ Xt + Rt−1Bt = WtNt + Bt+1 (9)
and the sequences of constraints in (7) and (8). Denote the current-value Lagrange multiplier
on (9) with Ψt. Expressing the Lagrange multipliers on (7) and (8) with ΨtΞt and ΨtΓt, then
8Ξt and Γt measure the value in units of either consumption good of marginally relaxing their
associated constraints.
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The equity requirement alters the interpretation of the multiplier on the budget constraint.
For an unconstrained household such as the saver, it equals the marginal value of permanent
income. In (11), Ψt represents the marginal value of additional current resources, because
the borrower cannot freely substitute intertemporally.
In (13), Γt equals the deviation from the standard Euler equation, the shadow value of
borrowing at time t. It is positive if the equity constraint binds at t and zero otherwise.
Iterating (12) forward yields Ξt as the present value expression of the current and future
values of Γt. Hence, even if the equity constraint does not bind currently, i.e., Γt = 0, Ξt
is positive if the constraint is expected to bind sometime in the future. This is because Ξt
equals the price of an asset that allows its holder to borrow today and in the future.
Equation (14) characterizes optimal durable good purchases. If the borrower’s equity
requirement never binds, then Ξt = Ξt+1 = 0 and (14) equates the purchase price of the
durable good to its immediate payoﬀ (the marginal rate of substitution between durable and
non-durable goods) plus its discounted expected resale value. In the more relevant case where
Ξt and Ξt+1 are both positive, it has the same interpretation where the borrower’s “purchase
price” is 1 − Ξt (1 − π)(1 − δ)/Rt. Because the durable good provides the household with
(1 − π)(1 − δ)/Rt units—the allowed loan-to-value ratio of the “asset” mentioned above —
the borrower’s eﬀective price lies below the real resource cost of 1.
9Equation (15) is the consumption-leisure condition. It has the usual form because it in-
volves only intratemporal substitution, which ﬁnancial market imperfections leave unchanged.
3.4.2 The Saver’s Problem
The saver’s utility maximization problem presents no novelties, but we present it here for the
sake of completeness. Given the constant capital stock, ˜ K, the initial durable goods ˜ S0 ,and
the ﬁnancial assets −R−1 ˜ B0; the saver chooses sequences of ˜ Ct, ˜ Xt, and ˜ Bt+1 to maximize
utility subject to
˜ Ct + ˜ Xt − ˜ Bt+1 = Ht ˜ K − Rt ˜ Bt. (16)
The right-hand side of (16) sums the sources of funds: Capital rental revenue, and the
market value of household debt. The left-hand side includes the three uses of these funds:
Non-durable consumption, purchases of durable goods, and saving.
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Equation (18) is a typical condition for optimal durable goods purchases, and (19) is the
standard Euler equation.
3.5 Production and Equilibrium
The standard conditions for proﬁt maximization of the representative ﬁrm are












Given the two households’ initial stocks of durable goods, ˆ S0 and ˜ S0, the stock of outstand-
ing debt issued by the borrower and held by the saver, B0 = ˆ B0 = − ˜ B0, the predetermined
10interest rate, R−1, and ˆ V0, a competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences for all prices and the
borrower’s, saver’s, and representative ﬁrm’s choices such that both households maximize util-
ity subject to the constraints, the representative ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt, the two households’
durable goods stocks evolve according to ˆ St+1 = (1 − δ) ˆ St + ˆ Xt and ˜ St+1 = (1 − δ) ˜ St + ˜ Xt,
and the input, product and debt markets clear.
Before proceeding to apply the model, we wish to comment on the model’s demographics.
The model is written with one saver and one borrower, but we intend the saver to stand-in
for the wealthiest ten percent of households while the borrower represents all others. Because
both households’ preferences are homothetic and the saver earns no labor income, we can
show that increasing the number of borrowers while holding the aggregate time endowment
constant has no impact on any equilibrium object except consumption per borrower. With
this in mind, we maintain the simplifying convention of referring to “the” borrower and “the”
saver.
4 Steady State Analysis
Comparison of the model’s steady state with diﬀerent values of π and φ provides an insight
into the long-run implications of changing the equity requirement and also guides the quan-
titative examination of the complete equilibrium path. Begin with the steady-state interest
rate, which equals R = ˜ β−1 from the saver’s Euler equation. With this in hand, it follows
that Γ = 1 − ˆ β/˜ β and
Ξ =
Γ
1 − ˆ β(1 − φ)
> 0.
That is, the saver’s rate of time preference determines the interest rate at a level below the
borrower’s discount rate; and the equity requirement limits the borrower’s steady-state debt.







(1 − Ξ(1 − π)(1 − δ)/R)

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
Lowering π and φ impacts ˆ S/ ˆ C through this shadow price. Consider ﬁrst lowering φ.
This increases Ξ and so shifts the borrower’s consumption towards durable goods. Lowering
π leaves Ξ unchanged but also has a positive impact on ˆ S/ ˆ C.8
8One question of possible interest that is tangential to this comparative steady-state analysis is “Which
11Because the equity requirement limits the borrower’s debt, we can determine ˆ B/ˆ S by









which clearly decreases with both π and φ.














In turn this determines the borrower’s hours worked, because the steady-state version of (15)









The results above imply that the right hand side decreases with π and φ. Hence, N increases
with these parameters. Altogether, lowering equity requirements shifts the borrower’s steady-
state allocation away from leisure and nondurable consumption and towards durable goods.
We now proceed to consider the saver’s steady-state consumption and wealth. Combining
the borrower’s steady-state labor supply with the ﬁrm’s optimality conditions immediately
yields W and H. Because lowering π and φ raises N, such a credit-market liberalization en-
dogenously shifts factor prices in favor of the saver. The saver’s steady-state income equals
R ˆ B +HK, which obviously increases as π and φ fall. Therefore, lowering the equity require-
ment increases steady-state income inequality. This redistribution has direct implications for
welfare: The saver is better oﬀ and the borrower is worse oﬀ in the new steady state. Of
course, a steady-state welfare comparison abstracts from the principle reason borrowers ﬁnd
it attractive to expand debt after deregulation: They can increase current consumption and
pay later. The next section lays the foundation for a complete welfare analysis by calculating
the equilibrium transition path following a reduction of π and φ in a calibrated version of
the model.
household spends a greater fraction of income on durable goods?” They diﬀer in two respects: The borrower
discounts the future with a lower discount factor, and the borrower faces a lower “shadow price” of durable
goods. The ﬁrst diﬀerence lowers ˆ S/ ˆ C relative to ˜ S/ ˜ C, while the second diﬀerence works oppositely. It is
not hard to show that the ﬁrst diﬀerence dominates the second, so that ˆ S/ ˆ C < ˜ S/ ˜ C. That is, although the
ability to buy durable goods with credit induces the borrower to raise ˆ S/ ˆ C, the borrower spends a greater
fraction of income on nondurable consumption because she is impatient to receive the future utility from
durable goods.
125 Quantitative Results
We ﬁrst describe the calibration of the model and the solution procedure, and then present
the results.
5.1 Calibration
The calibration of the model is similar to Campbell and Hercowitz (2006). The production
function elasticity α equals 0.3. The depreciation rate δ is 0.01, which is the appropriately
weighted average of 0.003 for owner-occupied residences and 0.031 for automobiles.9 For the
saver we chose ˜ β = 1/1.01, so that the quarterly interest rate is 1.0 percent; for the borrower,
we assign a relative impatience of 0.5 percent per quarter, i.e., ˆ β = 1/1.015. This degree of
impatience is similar in magnitude to that used by Krusell and Smith (1998). They use three
levels of time preference, with 0.72 percent between the two extremes.
The main aspect of the calibration is setting the values of π and φ for the high- and low-
requirement regimes. This calibration is based on the following correspondence between the
model and the data. The model’s loan-to-value ratio at the steady-state (1 − δ)(1 − π)/R is
matched to an average actual ratio; given the values of R and δ, this equality can be used to
solve for π. The steady-state amortization rate φ is matched to an average repayment rate.
Given the interpretation of the model’s durable goods stock St as homes and vehicles, the
values of these parameters are computed as weighted averages of estimates for mortgages and
car loans.
The calibration of π and φ involves the basic issues of choosing the sample period for
each of the model’s regimes and the type of data required. The discussion of the institutional
background in Section 2 provides guidance for these choices.
The sample period are determined as follows. For the high-requirement regime we use
observations through 1982, given that the timing of the Garn-St.Germain Act in October
of that year. We presume that immediately following deregulation the equity constraint is
not binding because of the large size of home equity that is cashable at that time. Because
it is much easier to read equity constraint parameters from data generated under a binding
constraint, we do not use observations immediately following 1982 to calibrate the post-
reform regime. According to Table 1, the eﬀective down payment on mortgages and the
9The source is “Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods in the United States, 1925-1997.” The service
life of 1-4 units residences is 80 years. Automobiles’ service life of 8 years is inferred from the reported non-
linear depreciation proﬁle. We used the weights 0.75 and 0.25, which are the shares of the owner occupied
residential stock and consumer durable goods stock in the 1954-2004 sample.
13percentage of mortgages reﬁnanced stabilize around 1995. This and the stabilization of the
debt/asset ratio around the same time—See Figure 3 below—both suggest that by then the
equity constraint binds again. Hence, we use observations from 1995 onwards to calibrate
the low-requirement regime.
As discussed in Section 2, data on individual mortgages have little relevance after dereg-
ulation: Loan-to-value ratios may not reﬂect initial equity shares because of the possibility
of more than one mortgage, and maturities are likely to be extended later by reﬁnancing.
Hence, we proceed as follows. For car loans, we use observations on down payments and
loan maturities in car loan contracts, which we assume reﬂect actual equity requirements in
the two sample periods. For mortgages, we use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances,
as reported in Section 2. The initial equity share for homes is computed as the average
equity share of households that purchased their homes within 12 months of the interview
date. Because maturities reported at the interviews do not take into account the likelihood
of future reﬁnancing, calibrating φ for the low-requirement regime necessitates an alternative
procedure. We set φ for this regime so that the model’s increase in the debt-to-asset ratio
across regimes equals the actual change from the pre-1983 sample to the post-1995 sample.
Additional details about calibration of π and φ are presented in Appendix A. The resulting
values are 0.16 and 0.0315 for the high-requirement regime, and 0.11 and 0.0161 for the low-
requirement regime.
The remaining parameters are θ and ω. We chose these simultaneously to match an average
share of hours worked of 0.3 and the average share of durable goods expenditure, 0.21, in
total households’ expenditures in the 1954:I-1982:IV sample.10 Given the other parameters,
including the π and φ values for the pre-reform regime, the unique values of θ and ω that
replicate these observations are 0.37 and 1.95. Table 2 summarizes the calibrated parameter
values.
In addition to lowering down payments on new loans and extending repayment of old
loans, the reduction of equity requirements enables immediate additional borrowing based
on accumulated equity. This is the “borrowing shock”, which is the diﬀerence between the
old and the new equity share on the stock ˆ S, held by the borrower in the initial steady state.
This diﬀerence equals
10To calculate this ratio, we adjusted the NIPA’s nondurable personal consumption expenditures by sub-
tracting the imputed service ﬂow of housing. We then added residential investment to personal consumption
expenditures on durable goods.











Table 2: Calibrated Parameter Values









where π, φ and π0, φ0 are the pre- and post-reform pairs of values. Given the model’s
calibration, this amounts to 70 percent of initial output. We assume that only half of this
amount can be borrowed.11
5.2 Transition Dynamics
Given the calibrated parameter values, the reduction of π and φ substantially impacts the
economy’s steady state. The change directly raises ˆ B/ˆ S from 0.26 to 0.48. The greater debt
burden increases ˆ N by 4 percent and lowers ˆ C by 3 percent. The greater borrowing capacity
of durable goods more than oﬀsets the income eﬀect from the additional debt, so ˆ S rises 2
percent. The saver’s additional wealth leads to a 12 percent expansion of both ˜ C and ˜ S.
To calculate the equilibrium path between the initial and the new steady state, we use
a modiﬁed version of Fair and Taylor’s (1983) procedure. We conjecture that the equity
constraint does not bind for the borrower until some date t∗ ≥ 0 and then binds forever,
and we calculate the path of prices, quantities, and Lagrange multipliers that satisﬁes all of
the optimality and market clearing conditions. If the resulting multipliers on the constraints
are all nonnegative and the households’ choices violate none of the constraints, then the
resulting path is the desired equilibrium. Otherwise, we search other values of t∗ until such
an equilibrium path is found.
We ﬁnd that t? = 30 given the parameters’ calibrated values. Figure 1 presents plots of
the equilibrium path for the model’s key quantities and the interest rate. The reform begins
at date 0 with a one-time unexpected reduction in π and φ and increase in ˆ V0—the borrowing
11Note that this assumption does not alter the new steady state, which is based only on π0 and φ0—along
with the constant parameters of the model.
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Figure 1: The Model’s Equilibrium Path
All variables, except the interest rate and the shares, are expressed in percentage points relative to their
initial steady-state values. Dashed lines give the initial steady-state levels.
16capacity of the durable goods’ stock given the equity requirements. The sudden excess of
equity over the required amount acts like a shock to the demand for loanable funds. Both the
debt and the interest rate immediately jump. Later, as debt growth slows down, the interest
rate gradually declines towards its steady-state value.
The interest rate jumps to a level between the two rates of time preference.12 The saver
defers consumption given the temporarily high rate of interest, and, before t?, the borrower
increases consumption of both goods and expands debt as would an unconstrained household
facing a temporarily low rate of interest. The behavior of hours worked traces the borrower’s
nondurable consumption. Its substantial fall implies a drop in output.
The borrower’s consumption pattern changes at t? because then the equity constraint
starts to bind again. The decline of nondurable consumption slows down, while ˆ St begins to
slope up. The intuition for this upward trend can be seen using the multiplier of the equity
constraint in (8),




which reﬂects the value of additional funds for the borrower. After t?, the gradual decline
of Rt increases Γt. Because durable goods provide borrowing possibilities, their value for the
borrower correspondingly increases over time. This lies behind the positive slope of ˆ St after
t?.
The evolution of inequality in wealth and durable goods over time follows directly from
the mechanism just described. Over the 25 year period shown in Figure 1, ˆ Bt rises by 80
percent. This implies a redistribution of wealth from the borrower to the saver. This is the
main force raising the saver’s share of total wealth from 81 percent in the initial steady state
to 86 percent after 25 years.13
The saver’s sale of durable goods to the borrower drastically diminishes inequality in
durable goods following the reform: The saver’s share of durable goods drops initially from
0.37 to 0.30. However, this does not last. Over time, the inequality of durable goods holdings
increases monotonically as the debt mounts.
12It is easy to show that in an endowment economy without borrowing constraints and only nondurable
consumption, the households’ rates of time preference bound the interest rate. Before t∗, the present economy
diﬀers from such economy in having also a ﬁxed endowment of labor, a leisure choice, and durable consump-
tion. However, the interest rate from this economy stays within the bounds from the simpler endowment
economy.
13The saver’s wealth is: stock market value + ˜ St + Bt; the borrower’s wealth is ˆ St − Bt.
17The initial small decline in the saver’s share of wealth appearing in Figure 1 is caused by
a stock market drop as the interest rate jumps up. The stock market value, computed as the
present value of capital income, falls initially by 10.8 percent, and then slowly recuperates
to approach its initial level in 25 years.
5.3 Welfare Analysis
With the equilibrium transition path in hand, we can calculate both households’ welfare
levels and compare them to their values in the initial steady state. Converting these utility
diﬀerences into permanent percentage changes in both goods required to achieve the new
utility level allows an interpersonal comparison of these gains. In principle a given household
could lose from the reform because the terms of trade move adversely, but in fact both house-
holds beneﬁt from the reform. The Saver’s utility gain equals 2.02 percent of consumption,
while the borrower’s is an order of magnitude lower, 0.26 percent.
This result naturally leads one to ask why the saver’s gains are so much larger than the
borrower’s? For this, it is helpful to decompose the borrower’s utility gain into two diﬀerent
components. The ﬁrst is the component from changing π, φ, and ˆ V0 but leaving the wage
and interest rate at their initial steady-state values. The borrower’s gain in this experiment
equals 1.35 percent of initial steady-state consumption. The equilibrium welfare gain is much
less than this because of two adverse movements in the terms of trade, the persistent increase
in Rt and the long-run decrease in Wt. The short-run increase in Wt does not oﬀset these.
All of the saver’s welfare gains arise from changes in the terms of trade, so the reason that
the borrower’s welfare gain is so much smaller than the saver’s is that the reform shifts the
terms of trade against the borrower.
To better understand which price changes inﬂuence these calculations more, we calculated
the transition path of an alternative model in which the saver receives an endowment of H
per period and the borrower operates a technology linear in labor with slope W. The only
endogenous price in this economy is the interest rate. In this case, the reform increases the
borrower’s welfare by 0.45 percent of initial consumption and the saver’s welfare by 1.36
percent. Apparently, the interest rate accounts for most of the welfare eﬀects of changes in
the terms of trade.
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Figure 2: Ownership Shares of the Wealthiest Ten Percent of Households
All ratios expressed in percentage points.
6 Interpretation of Macroeconomic Evidence
In this section, we examine observations from the U.S. economy since 1983 in light of the
theoretical results. The model has two novel predictions about this period: One is that the
distribution of household capital becomes substantially more equal before converging to the
less-equal steady state. The other is that debt growth is accompanied by high interest rates.
These two predictions are two interconnected aspects of the story: As borrowers increase
debt to ﬁnance consumption and household capital, the interest rate increases and their
share of household capital increases, both temporarily. We ﬁrst use SCF data to address
the evolution of the wealth distribution, and we then compare the joint evolution of interest
rates and household debt in the model and in the data.
6.1 The Distribution of Wealth and Durable Goods
In the U.S. economy, few rich households hold most wealth. The model economy’s saver
stands-in for these, while the borrower represents the remaining households. Accordingly, we
examine the evolution of inequality of wealth and its components by dividing households into
two groups: Those in the 1st through the 9th wealth deciles, and those in the 10th decile. The
ﬁrst group owes most of the debt, whereas the second owns most of the assets. In the model,
this distinction is extreme. The SCF provides the household balance sheet observations
required to implement this division empirically. With it, we calculate three measures of
inequality: the share of total wealth owned by the wealthiest ten percent of households,
those households’ share of owner-occupied real estate, and their share of vehicles.
Figure 2 plots these three inequality measures.14 It is well known that the distribution
14As mentioned in Section 2 we do not report results from the 1986 SCF due to the problematic sampling
19of wealth has become more unequal since the early 1980’s. The observations from the SCF
indicate that increase in wealth concentration occurred mostly in the 1990’s. Hence, if the
reform of the early 1980s aﬀected wealth inequality, this happened with a delay. To some
extent, the model reproduces such a delay, since wealth inequality initially drops after the
reform (due to stock-market decline caused by high interest rates) and only thereafter rises.
Regarding the other two assets, the wealthiest ten percent of households owned 35 percent
of owner-occupied housing and 20.7 percent of vehicles in 1983. These shares changed little in
the 1989 survey, then declined to 32 and 19.5 percent in 1995, and grew thereafter. In the 2001
SCF the owner-occupied housing share was 37 percent, while the vehicle share approached
its value in 1983. The model interprets this ”V” inequality shape as the allocative response
to borrowers’ increased demand for funds following the reform. Inequality in housing and
vehicles declines ﬁrst as borrowers use the new funds, while later, as the debt accumulates,
the process is reversed. In the model, the drop in the saver’s share of durable goods occurs
immediately after the reform, so it reproduces the sequence of changes to this measure of
inequality in the data but not the timing.
6.2 Household Debt and the Interest Rate
This paper departs from the observation that household debt rose substantially following the
deregulation of the early 1980s. Figure 3 quantiﬁes this expansion, which starts in 1983:III.
Using data from the Flow of Funds Accounts, it plots the ratio of nominal household debt
to the value of household capital (primarily homes and vehicles).15 The ratio grows from
0.32 in 1982 to 0.42 in 1995. The Figure’s dashed line gives the ratio of mortgage debt to
owner-occupied real estate, which displays virtually the same behavior. Both ratios level oﬀ
during the second half of the 1990s.
In the model, a large increase in the interest rate directly follows from the borrower’s
additional demand for funds, and it is well-known that interest rates rose dramatically in
1983. Figure 4 quantiﬁes this with a plot of the real three-year treasury rate. For this, we
used realized inﬂation over the leading twelve months as expected inﬂation. Using the last 12
months inﬂation produces a very similar picture. The average real rate for the “pre-Volcker”
procedure in this survey.
15In 1961, this ratio equalled 0.32 and it grew to 0.40 by 1966. This is the end of a long expansion of
household debt following the Korean War. The imposition of Regulation Q ceilings on Saving and Loans
institutions in 1966 combined with increasing nominal interest rates resulted in ﬁnancial disintermediation
which shows in Figure 3 as the decline in the ratio of debt to assets until 1982. See Campbell and Hercowitz
(2006) for more discussion of this history.
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Figure 3: Ratios of Household Debt to Tangible Household Assets
period in this sample, 1961:I-1979:III, was 1.6 percent. During the Volcker monetary policy
experiment, taken here to be from 1979:IV to 1982:IV, the real rate jumped to an average
of 6 percent. After the peak of 10.3 percent in 1981:3, the easing of monetary policy was
followed by a sharp decline in the real interest to the 5 percent level in 1983. In 1983:IV, with
a lag of only one quarter after the beginning of the debt/asset ratio increase in Figure 3, the
real rate starts to soar again. On average over the 1983:1995 period, which corresponding to
the rapid expansion of household debt, the real rate is 4.40, which is much higher than in
the pre-Volcker era and the post-1995 period.
The model’s comovement of the debt/asset ratio and the interest rate in Figure 1 provides
a straightforward interpretation to the behavior of actual variables in Figures 3 and 4. The
expansion of household credit demand triggered by lowering equity requirements induces an
increase in interest rates in order for savers to be willing to supply those funds.
Contemporaneous macroeconomic observers attributed the high real interest rates from
1983 through 1986 to expansionary ﬁscal policy. The fourth of Friedman’s (1992) lessons
from the Reagan deﬁcits is
Greater deﬁcits did result in, or at least coincide with, higher real interest rates.
(pp. 301)
Similarly, Blanchard (1987) wrote






Figure 4: Three-Year Real Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
The Three-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate from Federal Reserve Release H.15 minus realized annual
inﬂation using the chain-type deﬂator for Personal Consumption Expenditures other than Food and Energy.
By the end of 1982, budget deﬁcits had become the dominant macroeconomic
force. Large deﬁcits were strongly increasing aggregate demand and putting pres-
sure on interest rates. (pp. 27)
The growth of household debt after 1982 and our theoretical analysis suggest that in-
creased demand for private credit substantially contributed to this period’s high interest
rates. If this was not the case (i.e., the only cause of the high interest rates was the gov-
ernment deﬁcit) this should have led to a crowding out of household debt rather than the
dramatic increase which actually took place.
On the calculated transition path, the interest rate immediately rises about 0.9 percent.
It is of course hard to say how much of the actual interest rate increase in 1983 was caused
by additional borrowing demand (private or public), but it certainly exceeds the calibrated
model’s prediction. However, from the discussion in Section 5, the equilibrium interest rate
movements were conﬁned between the two households’ rates of time preference. With this
in mind, we experimented with the borrower’s rate of time preference. Raising it from the
6 percent annual rate in the calibrated model to 12 percent raises the initial interest rate
jump from 4.9 to 6.5 percent. Increasing the borrower’s rate of time preference further to
18 percent increases the initial interest rate to 7.5 percent. These results indicate that the
22interest rate change in the model can be quite large if the two households’ rates of time
preference diﬀer enough.
7 An Extension with Irreversible Investment
In Section 5, one of the counterfactual results was the large overnight transfer of durable
goods from the saver to the borrower. Here, we constrain each of the households to disinvest
household capital no faster than it depreciates. That is
ˆ Xt ≥ 0, ˜ Xt ≥ 0. (23)
We intend the constraints in (23) to reﬂect the diﬃculty of converting durable goods de-
manded by wealthy households (mansions) into durables more useful for the middle class
(2-bedroom houses). We next spell out how this constraint changes the model, and we then
describe the transition of the modiﬁed economy.
7.1 Utility Maximization
We solve the model using the following conjectures about the equity and irreversibility con-
straints. We verify that these hold good for the calculated equilibrium path.
• As in the basic model, the equity constraint binds for the borrower on and after some
date t? ≥ 0.
• The irreversibility constraint binds for the saver until some date t?? > 0. We conjecture
so because high interest rates generated by the additional borrowing demand should
induce the saver to substitute away from durable goods. This eﬀects weakens as the
interest rate falls, so the constraint should eventually become slack.
• The irreversibility constraint never binds for the borrower. Immediately following the
reform, the borrower wishes to increase its durable stock, and we expect the later
decline in the desired stock to occur gradually enough to not violate (23).
Given these conjectures, only the saver’s problem changes. Denoting the Lagrange multi-
plier on the irreversibility constraint with ΩtΥt (where Υt is, as previously, the multiplier of
23the saver’s resource constraint). With this, the ﬁrst-order condition for the Saver’s optimal
choice of ˜ St+1 is now
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When the irreversibility constraint binds (Ωt > 0,), the shadow price of durable goods for
the saver declines to induce the saver to slow down disinvestment.
Before considering the equilibrium path with this constraint, it is worth emphasizing
that the constraints in (23) do not rule out all trade in durable goods. We think of the
representative saver and borrower as stand-in’s for a large number of similar households. In
a slightly extended version of the model, two savers can trade installed household capital at
the price of 1 − Ωt. What the constraints do eliminate is any large and sudden reallocation
of household capital from savers to borrowers.
7.2 Transition Dynamics with Irreversible Investment
Figure 5 presents plots of the equilibrium path analogous to those in Figure 1 in Section 5.
Overall, the same mechanism also operates here: The borrower issues debt to the saver to
expand consumption and this raises the interest rate. Adding the irreversibility constraint
changes two speciﬁc aspects of the story. The ﬁrst follows directly from the friction in-
troduced: The initial reduction of ˜ St and initial increase of ˆ St are gradual now rather than
immediate. The calculated value of t?? is 17, so for four years after the reform, ˜ Xt = 0. When
the irreversibility constraint ceases to bind, both durable goods stocks switch directions. The
limit to the saver’s disinvestment also slows down the borrower’s deaccumulation of equity.
Accordingly, the equity requirement does not limit the borrower’s debt until t? = 33 quarters
after the reform.
The second aspect follows from the typical ampliﬁcation of price movements when quan-
tities are slow to adjust. The limit on the saver’s ability to generate loanable funds by selling
household capital ampliﬁes and sharpens the interest rate increase: Immediately after the
reform the interest rate jumps directly to it’s peak, 5.6 percent—rather than peaking later
and at a lower rate, 5.0 percent, as in Figure 1. The sluggish quantity behavior shows also
in the debt’s initial surge, which lasts t?? periods now, rather than one in the basic model.
A direct implication of the gradual initial changes in ˜ St and ˆ St is the slow decline in the
saver’s share of durable goods during t?? quarters. Hence, inequality in durable goods declines
gradually for about 4 years, and only then it starts to increase due to wealth redistribution.
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Figure 5: The Equilibrium Path with Irreversible Investment(i)
(i) All consumption variables expressed in percentage points relative to their initial steady-state values.
Dashed lines give the initial steady-state values.
25The stock market and the saver’s wealth share in Figure 5 behave very similarly as in
Figure 1. The only noticeable diﬀerence is that the initial drop in the stock market value is
more pronounced here, 12.5 percent instead of 10.8, due to the sharper interest rate hike.
8 Concluding Remarks
We contrast in this paper the transition of a calibrated model economy after a realistic
reduction of equity requirements on households with the evidence since the early 1980s.
A key feature of the model’s transition is the prolonged increase in household debt accom-
panied by high interest rates. This positive comovement reﬂects the eﬀects of the borrowing
shock triggered by allowing previously equity constrained households to cash out part of their
equity. The distributional counterparts of this process are the long-run increase in the saver’s
share of wealth (reﬂecting the borrower’s rising debt), and the non-monotonic behavior of
the saver’s share of durable goods. This share declines ﬁrst, and only later it increases to
a higher level than the initial one. More debt allows the relatively impatient households to
increase their share of durable goods during the ﬁrst stage of the transition. Due to the
mounting debt, however, the borrower’s share of durable goods should eventually decline.
These results are quantitatively similar to the actual evolution of the wealth distribution
in the United States since 1983 as well as the actual comovement of household debt and
interest. Hence, the model provides a simple interpretation of these facts, connecting them
into one phenomenon.
The model’s large overnight decline of hours worked following the reform is obviously
counterfactual. The model’s result is driven by the fact that the newly additional funds
make it possible for borrowers to immediately increase consumption and leisure. Modelling
the access to new borrowing as gradual process extends the decline in hours worked over a
period. The resulting downward trend in hours is also counterfactual for the period starting in
1983. Modelling the initial state as a recession was another possibility we tested. Given that
the U.S. economy was at the through of a deep recession at the reform, the recovery dynamics
could in principle oﬀset the decline in hours generated by this model. Quantitatively, however,
this eﬀect did not reduce dramatically the decline in hours.
The behavior of hours in the model, in which labor supply is standard, suggests the rele-
vance of indivisibilities and frictions in employment. For example, suppose that households
pay quadratic costs of adjusting hours worked. Such convex costs are relatively unimportant
for the small hours adjustments in business cycles, but they can be much more signiﬁcant for
26large changes such as that beginning the transition to high household debt. We examined
the impact of adjustment costs on our results in an extreme way by ﬁxing the borrower’s
hours worked. The simulation results in this setup were very similar to those presented here,
so we expect the results to survive other more empirically relevant modiﬁcations to the labor
market primitives.
The present model can be extended in diﬀerent directions to address additional aspects
of the link between ﬁnancial reform and macroeconomic behavior observed in the U.S. since
the 1980s.
Endogenous capital accumulation is a basic extension of the model. In such an extension,
we expect the initial surge in borrowing to depress productive investment. This, due to high
interest rates as well as low marginal productivity of capital when hours worked decline.
Over time, as hours worked trend up, the marginal productivity of capital should increase,
so the productive capital stock should rise above the initial level.
Endogenizing the capital stock will also have implications for the behavior of factor prices
and thus welfare results. For example, in the present setup, the wage declines when approach-
ing the new steady state—because the capital/labor ratio declines. With a variable capital
stock, the wage rate in the two steady states will be the same, and hence one of the saver’s
beneﬁts and borrower’s costs from the reform will disappear.
The link between credit policy and housing prices is another route to explore. For example,
a ﬁxed factor like land would generate curvature in the transformation of output into housing.
During the early stages of the transition, two opposite forces would aﬀect housing prices: The
borrower’s demand for housing is higher due to his newly available credit, while the saver’s
demand is lower given high interest rates. Hence, the relative price movement is not clear a
priori. In the long-run, however, reducing equity requirements should raise the relative price
of housing because of the eﬀective reduction in the cost of credit.
27Appendix
A Calibration of the Equity-Requirement Parameters
The calibration of the pre-reform values of π and φ proceeds as follows. For automobile loans,
we use the Federal Reserve Statistical release G.19, which reports average loan-to-value ratios
and repayment periods for automobile loans from 1971 onwards. Over the 1971-1982 sample,
the average loan-to-value ratio is 0.87 and the average term is 13.4 quarters. For mortgage
loans, the calibration is based on the Survey of Consumer Finances. The SCF includes the
year of home purchase, the equity stake in the home and the original maturity of the ﬁrst
two mortgages. Our basic measure of the initial equity share for homes is the average equity
share of households that purchased their homes within 12 months of the interview date, and
borrowed at least half of the home’s value. In the 1983 SCF, there are 104 such homeowners.
Their average equity share is 0.2275 with a standard error of 0.0137. For the same sample,
average mortgage maturity and its standard error are 85.5 and 3.8 quarters.
Because the 1983 SCF immediately followed the Garn-St. Germain Act, we think of these
terms as representative of mortgage terms at the time of the reform. To check whether they
are typical for the period prior to the reform as well, we examined trends in average mortgage
terms before 1983, as reported in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s Monthly Interest Rate
Survey. This survey covers single-family homes only; hence, it is more restrictive than the
SCF. This survey reports stable loan-to-value ratios from 1963, the ﬁrst available observation,
until 1982. Thus, the average initial equity share from the 1983 SCF of 0.2275 appears to be
a good estimate for the pre-reform period. In contrast to the stability of the loan-to-value
ratio, the average repayment period increased from 85.2 quarters in 1963 to 102.4 in 1982.
This increase indicates that average mortgage duration in 1983 was higher than the typical
duration for the period of interest. Hence, we adjust the 85.5 quarters measure from the
1983 SCF downwards by subtracting half of that increase. The resulting loan period is 76.9
quarters.
We measure mortgage and automobile debt repayment rates with the inverse of their
period-average terms to maturity, and then calculate φ as the weighted average of these
rates. The weights are the average shares of mortgage debt and consumer credit in total
household debt over the 1954-1982 period, that is 0.7 and 0.3. The resulting value of φ is
0.0315.
28Similarly, π is a weighted average of the initial equity shares from automobile and mort-
gage debt. Ideally, the weights should reﬂect the ﬂow of loans used to purchase new automo-
biles and homes. As such observations are not available, we construct the weights indirectly.
In a steady-state version of the model with two durable goods, loans extended in each cat-
egory should equal the principle repayment rate multiplied by the category’s steady-state
debt. Given the repayment rates and debt shares used to calibrate φ for the period before
1983:I, the implied shares of home and automobile loans in total loans extended are 0.29 and
0.71.16 The resulting value of π for the high-equity requirement regime is 0.16 (the weighted
average of 0.2275 for homes and 0.13 for automobiles).
For the post-reform values of π and φ use observations from 1995 onwards, when debt/assets
ratios stabilize.
The value of π is calculated similarly as for the pre-reform period. The average loan-to-
value ratio for automobiles in the 1995:I–2004:II sample is 0.92. The average equity share
of new home owners in the 1995 SCF and the 2001 SCF are 0.1756 and 0.1749—with the
standard errors 0.0090 and 0.0094. There are 334 and 251 new homeowners in these two
surveys. We use the average of the two years’ observations as our measure of the mortgage
down-payment rate. The average initial equity shares for both automobiles and homes decline
by 0.05 from the pre- to the post-reform period. Hence, we set the value of π for the latter
period equal to 0.11.
The post-reform value of φ is much more problematic to estimate. Because the ﬁnancial
reform substantially widened the options for reﬁnancing and home equity loans, the terms of
the initial mortgages ceased to represent the actual equity requirements. One possibility for
evaluating φ is to assume that the terms of automobiles loans still represent actual equity
constraints, and for homes, reﬁnancing and equity loans make it possible to extend the
loans’ terms to the entire life of the home. The latter assumption implies that the mortgage
repayment rate equals the home’s depreciation rate. Computing φ in this way causes the
debt/assets ratio to increase too much relative to the data. Hence, we set φ based on the
actual change in the debt/asset ratio from the 1954–1982 sample average of 0.34 to the 1995–
2005 sample average of 0.45. Given the other parameter values, for the model to reproduce
this 11 percentage point increase in the debt/asset ratio across steady states, the value of φ
has to decline from 0.0315 indicated above for the pre-reform period to 0.0186.
16The weight for home loans is computed as (0.70/76.9)/((0.70/76.9) + (0.30/13.4)) = 0.29, where 0.7/76.9
is the mortgage/total debt ratio times the repayment rate of mortgages and, similarly, 0.30/13.4 is the car
loans/total debt ratio times the repayment rate of cars loans.
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